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In the Supreme Court . 
of the State of Utah 
CLCARFIELD STATE BA:t-;'"K, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
"· 
PETERS PLLJMBING AND HEATIKG 
COMPANY, SALT LAKE AUTO 
AUCTION 11'\C, Al\'D 11\'DEMNITY 
INSURANCE COMPANY Ofl 
l\'ORTH AMERICA, 
DefendantJ and Re_rpondents. 
Case No. 
9043 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant has set forth a stiltcment of facts in rather 
considerable detail and it appears to be in most respeds correct. 
Inasmuch as the is~ues as to all respondents are the same, 
except in very limited situations which will be treated sepa-
rately in the brief, tbe respondents ha;·e all joined in this 
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• 
brief and the same is submitted on behalf of each and ali of 
th=. 
It is deemed advisable, however, to state very briefly the 
relative situations and positions of the parties to this pro-
ceeding. Salt Lake Auto Auction is in the wholesale automobile 
business and sells, through its auction, automobiles to dealers 
only. Salt Lake Auto Auction as such wholesaler is a licensed 
automobile dealer in Ctah. The Respondent Indemnity In-
surance Company of North America is the surety on the dealer's 
bond of Salt Lake Auto Auction. 
George B. West d/b/a West Motor Company was a reta~ 
used car dealer. West entered into an agreement with Salt 
Lake Auto Auction to purchase a motor vehicle which is the 
subject of this action. Possession of the car was given to West. 
Salt Lake Auto Auction was to retain the title to the vehicle 
until paid for, and under instructions from West transmitted 
the title documents along with a draft to West's bank, which, 
incidentally was and is the plaintiff in this action. West failed 
to pay the draft and thereby obtain the title, and said draft, 
together with the title was returned by the Bank to Salt Lake 
Auto Auction, who kept and retained the title. In the meantime, 
West, without the knowledge or consent of Salt Lake Auto 
Auction, entered mto the conditional sales contract for the 
sale of said automobile to Respondent Peters Plumbing & 
Heating Company, said conditional sales contract being as· 
signed by West to the plaintiff and Appellant herein, all as 
appear from the face of the documents in the files. 
As further appears from the files and records, including 
the affidavits supporting the motions for summary judgment, 
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neither West, nor his assignee, the Appellant herein, ever did 
deliver title to said motor vehicle to Peters Plumbing & Heating 
Co,mpany, or to any person or agency on behalf of Peters 
Plumbing and Heating Company, including the .Motor Vehicle 
' ' Department of Utah, within twenty"four hours or at all, for 
the very good reason that West never did have nor.never did 
become entitled to ha\·e the title or indicia of title to said 
motor vehicle. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE 
PLAINTIFF HAS A RIGHT TO ALLEGE OR SET FORTH 
ALTERNATE OR INCONSISTEKT CLAIMS IS NOT AN 
ISSUE IN THIS ACTION. 
POINT 1I 
THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES OJ; MATERIAL 
FACTS. 
POINT [fl 
SALT LAKE AUTO AUCTION AND INDEM!\ITY 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA WERE 
AND ARE F.!\ TITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER 
OF LAW BECAUSE: 
(A) THE PROVISIONS OF S.ECTIO:\JS 41-3-2 AND 
41-3-3 PROHIBIT PLAINTIFF FROM MAIN-
TAINING ITS ACTION. 
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(B) THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL, AS REFERRED 
TO IN THE CASE OF HEASTON VS. MAR. 
TINEZ IS NOT APPLICABLE TO SALT LAKE 
AUTO AUCTION OR INDEMNITY INSUR. 
ANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA. 
(C) THE CASE OF HEASTON VS. MARTINEZ IS 
UNSOUND AND SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
(D) THE PROVISIONS OF SEC. 41+2 ARE NOT 
APPLICABLE TO SALT LAKE AUTO AUC 
TION. 
POINT IV 
PETERS PLUMBING & HEATING COMPANY JS 
ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER 
OF LAW. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE 
PLAINTIFF HAS A RIGHT TO ALLEGE OR SET FORTH 
ALTERN ATE OR INCONSISTENT CLAIMS IS NOT AN 
ISSUE IN THIS ACTION. 
Respondents have no argument with the right of the 
plaintiff to set forth different, alternative and even incon· 
sistent claims in his complaint; nor do we now, nor did we 
at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, contend 
that Respondents were entitled to rely on allegations most 
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favorable to them, or any of them, and ignore allegations most 
favorable to the plaintiff, if in fact there were any real and 
material issues of fact. Under the theory of the Respondents 
and each of them, however, we do not feel that there arc-any 
allegations, consistent or not, which give rise to inaterial issues 
of fact. This phase of the case will be developecl in connection 
w1th the arguments on other points herein. 
In passing, however, we suggest that even under the pres 
ent liberal rules of pleading, and including Rule 8 (e) ( 2) 
quoted by Appellant, a plaintiff may not, in the same count 
allege facts as relates to one defendant and then take the 
position that if such allegation of fact favors another defendant 
in the action, that as to such other defendant plaintiff can 
ignore the allegation and claim it does not bind him except 
as it suits his best purposes and as it relates to the defendant 
to whom he would have it relate. 
POINT II 
THERE ARE NO GEKUIKE ISSUES OP MATERIAL 
FACTS. 
Appellant contends that as between the Appellant and 
the Respondents Salt Lake Auto Auction and Indemnity In-
surance Company of Korth America, there are two issues of 
fact present. 
First, it is contended, 1S the issue "Whether or not plaintiff 
ts a bona fide purchaser for value of the conditional sales 
contract covering the sale of the Chevrolet automobile tu Peters 
Plumbing and Heating Company by the dealer, George B. 
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West." We do not know what Appellant means by "bona fide 
purchaser for value of the conditional sales contract," Cer· 
tainly, Appellant cannot seriously contend that such a contract 
is in the category of a negotiable instrument so that it is taken 
free of any defenses. Hence, appellant must simply mean that 
the contract was taken by appellant without any knowledge 
as to infirmities therein. The contract which is attached as a 
part of the complaint shows on its face that appellant took it 
simply as an assignee of GEORGE B. WEST, with full re· 
course, the assignment stating that "the undersigned hereby 
sells and assigns the within contract and all of his, its or their 
right, title and interest in and to the property subject thereto 
* * * ."' Hence, appellant took and received only what West 
had and subject to defenses against West. This general rule 
is stated in CJS, Assignments, Sec. 84 as follows: 
"No matter what the property or thing passed, the 
right or title acquired by the assignee is simply that 
previously possessed by the assignor and no more." 
Be that as it may and regardless of whether or not the 
appellant took the assignment in good faith without any 
knowledge of infirmities in the title, this is not a material 
issue, by reason of the statutory restrictions of Sections 41·J.2 
and 41·3·3 UCA 1953 which will be referred to in detail in 
argument of other points in this brief, and which statutes 
specifically provide that the plaintiff and appellant has no 
standing in the Court. 
Second, it is contended by appellant that there is an issue 
of fact as to "whether or not the automobile was sold to 
GEORGE B. WEST giving title or ownership of such auto· 
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bile to WEST at the time he sold· the same to Peters Plumbing 
& Heating Company and sold a conditional sales contract to 
plaintiff.'' 
This again, if an issue, is not an issue of material fact 
for the reasons above set forth. Furthermore, as appellant 
states, his first course of action is purely and simply a count 
in claim of delivery. No allegation is made th:it the Salt 
Lake Auto Auction had possession of, or was withholding, 
~;aid motor vehicle from the plaintiff and appellant. Hence, 
no relief could be had against Salt Lake Auto Auction on that 
cause of action. On the second cause of action, the allegations 
clearly set forth that appellants were purely and simply as-
signees of GEORGE B. WEST of the conditional sales contract 
and that West failed to deliver title to the automobile within 
48 hours as required by Sec. 41-3-2 above referred to. Such. 
being the case, the appellant has no standing in Court and 
hence the matters referred to, even though an issue of fact, 
are not material issues of fact. 
The re'J.SOns why said matters referred to by appellant, 
even though issue of fact, arc not material issues of fact will 
become apparent in connection with the arguments on the 
other points which follow in this brief, and, hence repetitious 
argument under this point will be omitted. 
POINT III 
SALT LAKE AUTO AUCTION AND INDEMNITY 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA WERE 
AND ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER 
OF LAW BECAUSE: 
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(A) The provisions of Sections 41-3-2 and 41-3-3 {H'ohibit 
plaintiff from maintaining its action. 
Preliminarily, it should be mentioned that it is obvious 
that Indemnity Insurance Company of North America, as surety 
on the bond of Sa.lt Lake Auto Auction, cannot be held in the 
action unless there is first some basis for holding Salt lake 
Auto Auction. 
In any light, the undisputed facts as shown by the plead-
ings and :files of this case are that Salt Lake Auto Auction 
delivered possession to the car in question to George B. West, 
an automobile dealer, said respondent, Salt Lake Auto Auction 
retaining the indicia of title to the car; that West purported 
to sell and did deliver said car to defendant Peters Plumbing 
& Heating Company under the conditional sales contract Ex-
hibit "A" attached to the complaint; that West assigned said 
contract to the appellant without recourse; that neither West 
nor his assignee the appellant herein, could or did deliver 
to the vendee (Peters Plumbing & Heating Company) and 
endorsed according to law a certificate of title issued for said 
motor vehicle by the State Tax Commission. 
Sec. 41-3-2 and 4-3-3 UCA 1953 provides as follows: 
"41-3-2-Certificate of title to vendee--Every person, 
firm. or corporation upon the sale and delivery of any 
used or second hand motor vehicle shall within forty-
eight hours thereof deliver to the vendee, and endorsed 
according to law, a certificate of title, issued for said 
vehicle by the state tax commission.'' 
"41-3-3-Penalties for violation of act-No action 
or right of action to recover any such motor vehicle, 
or any part of the selling price thereof, shall be main-
10 
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tained in the courts of this state by any such dealer 
or vendor, his successor or assigns, in any case wherein 
such vendor or dealer shall have failed to comply 
with the terms and provisions of this act, and such 
vendor or dealer, upon conviction for the violation of 
any of the provisions of this act shall be deemed guilty 
of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of 
not more than $299 or by imprisonment for not more 
than six months in the county jail, or by both such fine 
and imprisonment." 
Nothing could be more clear than that neither West nor 
his successor and assigns (the plaintiff-appellant herein) could 
maintain any action in the courts of this State to recover the 
motor vehicle or any part of the selling price. No statute .:ould 
be drafted in language more clear. 
The appellant has contended that because the contract 
provides that "the seller may assign this contract without notice 
to purchaser and when assigned it shall be free from any 
defense, counterclaim or cross complaint by the purcli.aser," 
that the defense of the above statute, and all other defenses 
are gone. It is a proposition of law concerning which there 
seems to be no conflicts in the authorities, that a statute enacted 
for the protection of the public and particularly a criminal 
statute, may not be nullified by an anticipatory waiver. If 
such were not the rule, in every contract where one party might 
have some little advantageous position, such party could and 
no doubt would insert a provision that all statutory and other 
defenses which the other party had were waived. The rule 
is set out in 56 Am. Jur., Waiver Section 7, as follows: 
"Because requirements of a statute enacted for the 
public good may not be nullified or varied by private 
11 
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contract, the donee of a private right created by 5tatute 
for the public good does not have the legal right to 
make an anticipant waiver of such right." 
It was for just such cases as the one before this Court 
that the statutes relied upon a5 above set forth were enacted. 
If by the simple expedient of including a waiver in the contract, 
the statutes could be nullified, the Legislature might as well 
refrain from passing any regulatory statutes and simply leave 
the public to the obligation of protecting itself contractually, 
regardless of the difference in bargaining powers between the 
parties to the action and regardless of the belief of the Legis-
lature as to the necessity in the public interest, for regulating 
certain businesses and of providing penalties for failure to 
comply with such regulations. 
The statutes referred to above say clearly that the appel-
lant has no right to maintain action in the courts of this State, 
and all defendants and respondents herein proceed upon the 
assumption that the statutes mean what they clearly say. The 
wording of Sec. 41-3-3 in fact effectively divests the Courts 
of this State of jurisdiction in any action brought by a vendee 
or his assignee in connection with a transaction wherein Sec. 
41-3-2 has not been complied with. Certainly, by a printed 
provision in a contract provided and furnished by the vendor 
of an automobile, jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the 
Courts of this State in direct contravention to a statutory 
prohibition. 
(B) The doctrine of estoppel, as t"eferred to in the case 
of Heaston z·.r. Martinez is not applicable to Salt Lake Auto 
Auction or Indemnity Insurance Company of North America. 
l2 
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Contention is made by the appellant that the Salt Lake 
Auto Auction is estopped to claim a title or .lien superior to 
plaintiff's (appellant's) and cites as authority therefor the case 
of Heaston vs, Martinez, 3 Utah 2d 259; 282 P 2d 833. Cer-
tainly the doctrine of that case does not extend to the extent 
of estopping the wholesaler of an automobile from asserting 
his claim against the retailer to whom he delivered the car 
and who fraudulently sold the same without paying for or 
acquiring any title or indicia of title thereto. Plaintiff as 
assignee of West's interest in the conditional sales wntract 
must stand in West's shoes. West could certainly not assert 
any claim against Salt Lake Auto Auction and surel.y neither 
can his assignee. 
Furthermore, the appe!lant Bank, as the financing institu-
tion dealing in automobile financing, is not in the same position 
as the customer who enters the used car lot to buy a vehicle. 
The Bank knows, or certainly should know, that in order for 
a dealer to have any right to sell a motor vehicle he must have 
in his possession the title doo-:ments thereto. properly endorsed 
as provided by Sec. 41-1-65 1953, which provides as follows: 
''Transfers /u dealers-When the transferee of a 
vehicle is a dealer who holds the same for resale and 
operates the same only for purposes incident to a re. 
sale and displays thereon the registration plates issued 
for such vehicle, or when a transferee does not drive 
such vehicle or permit it to be driven upon the highways, 
the transferee shall not be required to obtain transfer 
of registration of such vehicle or forward the certificates 
of title and registration to the department, but such 
transferee upon tran~Jerdng his title or interest to 
another person shall execute and acknowledge an 
Ll 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
assignment and warranty of title upon the certificate 
of title and deliver the same and the certificate of reg-
istration to the person to whom such transfer is made." 
It was incumbent upon the appellant before accepting 
the conditional sales contract to require some evidence of 
title thereto from the dealer from whom they accepted the 
assignment. The assignment of the contract on the reverse of 
Exhibit "A"' shows by its clear words that the Bank, in dealing 
with the dealer West, relied upon West and upon his war-
ranties as to title. Appellant can point to nothing which the 
defendant Salt Lake Auto Auction did or failed to do which 
in any wise controlled or influenced appellant's action in 
either accepting or rejecting the assignment of the conditional 
sales contract. No representations were made and no thing 
was done by Salt Lake Auto Auction which caused or could 
have caused the appellant Bank to alter or change the manner 
in which it dealt with West in connection with the acceptance 
of the assignment of the conditional sales contract. Had Salt 
Lake Auto Auction registered the motor vehicle and shown 
itself as the legal owner thereon on a title issued by the Utah 
State Motor Vehicle Department and had Salt Lake Auto 
Auction held such a title so showing its name as the legal 
owner thereof, such, under the situation in this case, would not 
have in any way affected the actions of the appellant Jlank. 
It is obvious appellant took the assignment solely on the 
faith and representations of its own assignee and without any 
representations or action on the part of Salt Lake Auto Auction 
concerning which it did or reasonably could rely in connec· 
cion with its dealings with George B. West, except that Salt 
Lake Auto Auction gave bare possession of the motor vehicle 
to West. 
14 
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We submit that the Heaston case did not go to such an 
extreme as to raise an estoppel in favor of the Bank, as the 
assignee of the wrongdoer, and against the owner of the motor 
vehicle. 
Appellant cites as further authority in its favor the case of 
jones vs. Commercial Investment Trust Company, 64 Utah 151 
220 P. 896. That case is not in any respect in point. That was 
a so-called "floor plan" case. The motor company was pur" 
chasing cars from the factory and the same were financed and 
floored by the defendant. The automobile dealer received a 
bill of sale for each automobile and on receipt thereof paid 
20% of the price of the car, plus freight. Title was transferred 
to the finance company by an instrument called a negotiable 
trust receipt which provided that the dealer was to display 
and sell the car, and upon such sale was to remit the purchase 
price of the finance company. The dealer did so sell, but failed 
to remit. The trust receipt documents on their face, and if 
displayed to the buyer, or to his financing institution, would 
have shown the right and in fact the intention for the dealer 
to sell and dispose of the car and collect the money therefor 
on behalf of the company which was carrying the .floor plan 
financing. \Ve submit that the circumstances are so unlike our 
case as to require no comment. 
(C) The case of Heaston ~·s. Martinez is unsound and 
should be ret•tfJed. 
Until the case of Heaston VJ. Alartinez was decided, no 
proposition seemed more clearly settled than that in order to 
transfer title to a motor vehicle and deprive the owner of the 
rights thereto, it was unnecessary that the actual certificate 
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of ownership be endorsed, delivered and a new certificate of 
registration and certificate of ownership issued. The publlc 
generally and people dealing in thfO purchase and sale of auto-
mobiles as a business relied upon the provisions of Sec. 41-1-72 
UCA 1953, which provides that until such issuance of the 
new certificates of registration and ownership "delivery of 
any vehicle required to be registered shall be deemed not to 
have been made and title thereto shall be deemed not to have 
passed and said intended transfers shall be deemed to be in-
complete and not to be valid or effective for any purpo>e."' 
Likewise, until said case, those engaged in the wholesale 
and retail buying and selling of motor vehicles felt secure in 
the belief that the law was well established, that the me[e 
entrusting of bare possession of a motor vehicle by the owuer 
thereof, even to one who habitually sells such goods, without 
at the time giving to such person indicia of ownership, would 
not jeopardize the right of the owner to claim his property as 
against someone who purchased from the one to whom the 
property was entrusted. Among those persons who were deal-
ing in the wholesale and retail buying and selling motor ve· 
hides, the practice had become almost uniform in connection 
with dealings between motor vehicle dealers that the owner 
or wholesaler of a motor vehicle, in arranging to sell a 
vehicle for resale would deliver possession of the motor vehicle 
to that dealer and, if cash were not paid at the time, would 
transmit the title documents to the purchasing dealer's bank 
with a draft; that the purchasing dealer would then pay the 
draft and obtain the title papers, but that until such payment 
was made and said title papers obtained, the wholesaling 
dealer need not ha\·e any worries about his right to the motor 
16 
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vehicle. This orderly and customary method of doing business 
has now been thrown into utter confusion and, in the light 
of the Heaston vs. J11artinez case, such wholesale dealers have 
no means at their command of protecting their interests in 
motor vehicles which they contract to sell and do deliver to 
other dealers for resale, unless they demand the full cash 
purchase price at the time possession of such motor vehicles 
are delivered. 
Untill-Ieaston lJS. 111at·tinez case came down, such motor 
vehicle dealers felt secure in the belief that both under the 
motor vebicle statutes and under the statutes as relates to 
sales of goods, they were securely protected by retaining the 
documents of title until payment was made for the motor 
vehicle; unless, of course, they did something in addition to 
giving bare possession of the car to the retail dealer which 
would mislead some person who was dealing with such dealer. 
We submit that the Court ought again to review the 
situation as relates to the law of the lfeaston ~·s. Martinez 
case. We call the Comt's attention to the various authorities 
with regard to the principles of law which we feel ought to 
prevail. In 46 Am. Jur. at page 620, Sec. ·158, the rule is stated 
as follows: 
"It is a general rule as regards personal property 
that title, like a stream, cannot rise higher than its 
source; and therefore, it is a general principle that a 
seller without title cannot transfer a better title than 
he has, unless some principle of estoppel comes into 
operation against the person claiming under what 
would otherwise be the better title, as where the owner 
by some direct and unequivocal act has clothed the 
seller with the indicia Of ownership, or unless the 
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seller has authority from the owner. In other words, 
the seller of property other than negotiable securities 
can .?rdinarily convey no greater rights than he himself 
has. 
In Blashfield, Volume 7, Section 4357, it is stated: 
"A person who purchases an automobile from ~ 
dealer without obtaining the title papers, or in relianc~ 
on the dealer's promise to furnish the title papers late! 
without making any eHort to ascertain the true owner-
ship, acquires no title as against the owner, where the 
owner, for example, had attached the title papers to 
a draft and had sold and delivered the automobile to 
the dealer subject to payment of the draft, which was 
never paid." 
The same subject is discussed in Williston on Sales, 
Sections 313 and 314, wherein the rule is stated to be that 
entrusting possession of goods, even to one who habitually 
sells such goods, does not without more create an estoppel. 
Sec. 313 reads in part as follows: 
"Although entrusting possession to another may 
lead an innocent third person to believe the posse1.Sor 
i~ the owner, no court has gone so far as to hold that 
the mere entrusting with possession would preclude 
the owner from asserting his title. If the owner of 
goods is responsible for or cognizant of no other de· 
ceptive circumstances, it is an entirely proper thing 
for him to entrust another with the goods either for the 
advantage of the owner or of the possessor, and the 
law has never attempted to debar the owner from so 
doing * * *" 
This Court in the Heaston t·.r. JL1fti!lez case reasoned, 
in the majority opinion, that Sec. 41-1-72, which requires the 
actual issuance of a .new certificate of registration and owner· 
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ship before any transfer is valid for any purpose, does not 
apply in connection with situations such as in this case because 
of the provisions of 41"1-65, which reads as follows: 
"When the transferee of a vehicle is a dealer who 
holds the same for resale and operates the same only 
for purposes incident to a resale * * * the transferee 
shall not be required to obtain transfer of registration 
of such vehicle or forward the certificates of title and 
registration to the department, but such transferee upon 
his title or interest to another person shall execute and 
acknowledge an assignment and warranty of title upon 
the certificate of title and deliver the same and the 
certificate of registration to the person to whom such 
transfer is made." 
We submit that even under such reasoning of the Court, 
nevertheless, at least Sec. 41-1-65 ought to be' complied with 
before any transfer would be effective as behveen dealers. 
In other words, in order for any transfer to be effective between 
dealers, the transferor must at least execute and acknowledge 
an assigrunent and warranty of title and deliver the same to 
his transferee. Persons ought to be bound to know the law 
and we submit that if Sec. 41-1-72 under ordinary circum-
stances is a notice statute and that persons are presumed to 
know the laws as related therein, that Sec. 41-1-65 is also a 
statute which people ought to be presumed to know and that 
a purchaser ought then at least to be bound to inquire of the 
retail automobile dealer and say, "Let me see the assignment 
and warranty of title." 
But going further with regard to the case of Heaston tiS. 
Martinez, which case, of course, was based solely upon the 
doctrine of estoppel, we submit that under the factual situation 
19 
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there, and, of course, similarly under the factual situation in 
the case now before this Court, there can be no basis for 
application of the doctrine of estoppel as we have always. 
known it in the law. As pointed out so clearly in the dissenting-
opinion of Mr. Justice Henroid, the test as to whether there 
IS an estoppel ought to be 
"What has the owner given to the seller which makes 
it appear to the BUYER that the seller is authorized to 
sell? Indicia of ownership amounting to a representa-
tion upon whicb an estoppel might be bottomed is 
determined by looking at the facts through the eyes of 
a reasonable buyer, who reasorutbly can believe the 
seller has authority to sell-not through the eyes of 
the owner." 
The only thing which the buyer of this motor vehicle 
could see (insofar as anything which the Salt Lake Auto 
Auction did) was plain, ordinary, naked possession. There 
was nothing Salt Lake Auto Auction did, nothing it said, 
nothing it delivered to the retail dealer West, except-that it 
gave him bare possession of the motor vehicle. What act of 
Salt Lake Auto Auction, or what other thing than bare posses-
sion was there or could there have been on which it could 
be said that either the purchaser, Peters Plumbing and Heating 
Company, or the plaintiff Bank relied? What did Salt Lake 
Auto Auction do or give which made it appear to any third 
person that George B. West was authorized to sell the motet 
vehicle? 
What ran a person do to protect himself when he lets 
someone take bare possession of his property if the doctrine of 
Heaston r·s. Martinez is to stand? We assume the greatest pro-
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tection and notice of ownership might have resulted in Salt 
Lake Auto Auction had it, before delivering the motor vehicle 
to West, registered the automobile in its name with the Utah 
State Tax Commission and had a Utah title issued in the 
name of Salt Lake Auto Auction and then retained that title 
in its possession. Let us assume it had done just that. Would 
that have changed the picture in any regard so far as West, 
or his purchaser, Peters Plumbing and Heating Company, or 
the plaintiff bank, as assignee of the sales contract, are con-
cerned? If Salt Lake Auto Auction gave bare possession of the 
car toW est and retained the title so issued in its name, it would 
have made no difference whatsoever in this situation, insofar 
as any appearances are concern::d which could be observed by 
either West's purchaser or the plaintiff bank. Such would 
have given neither of them more to see when they dealt w1th 
West than they actually saw under the conditions which 
existed. Inquiry by Peters Plumbing Company or by the bank 
under the state of the title as it actually existed would have 
disclosed that there was no title in West, or at least that 
West could not produce one. Again, we say; "W'here, then, 
was any slight thing, in addition to- bare possession, which 
Salt Lake Auto Auction gave to West or did which can be 
said to have in any way influenced the mind or thinking 
of either West's purchaser or the plaintiff bank in this 
transaction so as to raise an estoppel as against Salt Lake 
Auto Auction, the owner of the motor vehicle? 
We submit that however the matter is viewed, the case of 
Heatson vs. Martinez stands simply for the proposition that 
the giving of bare possession of one's property to another 
is sufficient to raise an estoppel. We further submit that such 
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is not sound law; that the matter ought to be reviewed and 
that case ought to be specifically and directly overruled. 
(D) The provisions of Sec. 41-3-2 are not applicable to 
Salt Lake Auaion. 
Sec 41-3-2, upon which plaintiff tests its claim against 
Salt Lake Auto Auction and its insurance carrier, Indemnity 
Insurance Company of North America, provides: 
"Every person,'firm, or corporation upon the sale and 
delivery of any used 01 second hand motor vehicle 
shall within forty-eight hours thereof deliver to the 
vendee, and endorsed according to law, a cet'tificate 
of title, issued for said vehicle by the State Tax Cum-
mission." 
The case of Heaston rs. Martinez, if it stands dearly for 
any proposition, stands for the proposition that Sec. 41-1-65, 
relating to transfers to dealers, makes it unnecessary to have, 
and in fact contemplates that there shall not be, a "certificate 
of title issued * * * by the State Tax Corrunission" for a 
vehide, where the transfer is to a dealer. The majority opinion 
in the Heaston case rests upon the proposition that the vehicles 
were not required to be registered in the dealer's name, nor 
was the dealer required to forward to the Motor Vehicle 
Depl!rtment the certificates of title and registration. Such being 
the case, as to the transaction between Salt Lake Auto Auction, 
which is the wholesale dealer, and \Vest, who was the dealer 
who purchased from Salt Lake Auto Auction, there was not 
in existence any "certificate of title issued for said vehicle by 
the State Tax Commission" (this being a foreign title)-the 
statutes neither required nor contemplated that any such cer· 
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tificate be obtained; and hence the provisions of Sec. 41-3-2 
cannot possibly apply. 
Such being the case, there is no violation of any provi-
sion of the Motor Vehicle Act alleged which would be the 
basis for a claim against Salt Lake Auto Auction or the surety 
on its dealer's bond under the provisions of Sec. 41-3-18 
UCA 1953, or at all. 
POINT IV 
PETERS PLUMBING & HEATING COMPANY IS 
ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER 
OF LAW. 
As argued and set forth above, if Sec. 43-3-2 and 43-3-3 
UCA 1953 mean anything, they prevent the appellant herein 
from pursuing its claim, either for the automobile involved, 
or for any part of the purchase price thereof, by any action 
in the Courts of this State. It is undisputed that West, a vendor, 
failed to deliver the title within 48 hours, or at all, for the 
simple reason that he had no title. It is also undisputed that 
the plaintiff is West's successor and assignee in interest on 
the conditional sales contract. 
If Sec. 43-3-3 means what it says, that is, that no action 
shall be maintained by the vendor or his successors or assigns, 
that seems conclusively to settle the matter and there was no 
alternative than for the Court to grant the motion for summary 
judgment. 
The matter of wa1ver and the inability of a person to 
give a binding anticipatory waiver of a right created by statute 
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for the protection of the public has been referred to fully in 
the arguments heretofore in this brief. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that under the facts in this case and from the 
_files and the pleadings therein, and under the law, the Court 
properly granted the motioru of the respondents herein, namely, 
Peters Plumbing & Heating Company, Salt Lake Auto Auction, 
Inc. and Indemnity Insurance Company of North America, and 
each of them, for summary judgment as against the plaintiff 
and appellant herein. The judgment of the Court below should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ZAR E. HAYES 
721 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
OF PUGSLEY, HAYES, RAMPTON & WATKJSS, 
Attorneys for Respondents Salt Lake Auto 
Auction Inc. and Indemnity Imurance 
Company of North America, 
DAVID K. WATKISS, 
Attomey jot' Respondent Peters Plumbing & 
Heating Company. 
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